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LABILITY INSURANCE AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION:
THE EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM*
The tort system has an ambivalent attitude toward liability insur-
ance. On the one hand, an insured defendant is more likely to be
able to satisfy the full amount of a judgment against it than an unin-
sured defendant. Liability insurance is therefore favored, because it
facilitates the compensation of successful plaintiffs. On the other
hand, liability insurance may generate moral hazard, since other
things being equal, insured parties are likely to be less concerned
about the threat of liability than uninsured parties. Liability insurance
may thereby undermine accident prevention. For more than a century
now this ambivalence has manifested itself in a variety of ways, in both
judicial decisions and in debates about tort reform.
This Article is about the way in which ideas about the relation
between liability insurance and accident prevention have evolved
from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present. These
ideas are part of a larger story about the symbiotic relationship be-
tween tort liability and insurance during this entire period. Much
more is involved in this story than liability insurance and accident pre-
vention alone. Other forms of insurance, and other goals, also figure
prominently. And the story involves more than ideas. The way in
which tort liability and various forms of insurance have influenced
each other in practice is at least as significant as the way that ideas
about this relationship have evolved. Nonetheless, ideas have conse-
quences, and ideas about this relationship-including Guido Cala-
bresi's important ideas about it-have affected the development of
the law for nearly two centuries now.
This Article is being presented during a portion of the Confer-
ence1 devoted to Calabresi's impact on the law and scholarship of
mass torts. Although the influence of ideas about the relation be-
* Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Class of 1966 Research Profes-
sor, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to my colleagues Vincent Blasi and
G. Edward White for their comments on an earlier version of this Article. Portions of the
Article are part of a book I am writing about the influence of tort liability on the develop-
ment of insurance, and the influence of insurance on the development of tort liability,
over the last 150 years.
1. Calabresi's The Costs ofAccidents. A Generation of Impact on Law and Scholarship,
University of Maryland School of Law (April 23-24, 2004).
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tween liability insurance and accident prevention on mass tort liability
has been attenuated, toward the end of the Article I will briefly try to
show that there has in fact been such an influence and that Calabresi's
writing figures importantly in that influence.
When The Costs of Accidents2 was published, mass tort litigation was
virtually nonexistent, and the very idea of a mass tort was only begin-
ning to emerge.3 For example, the first appellate decision to recog-
nize a cause of action for asbestos-related personal injury was issued in
1973, 4 three years after Calabresi's book was published. The other
mass tort actions that we have now come to recognize as paradigms in
the field came later that decade. The first Dalkon Shield5 and DES
actions' were filed in the mid-1970s, and the first Agent Orange ac-
tions were filed in 1978.7 So it is no surprise that Calabresi did not
expressly address mass tort issues in his book. Indeed, the types of
tort cases that were in the forefront at that time, and that the book
can be understood to be addressing most concretely, involved auto-
mobile litigation and sporadic forms of products liability.
But of course The Costs of Accidents is about far more than auto
accidents and product-related injuries. It is a view of tort liability for
accidental injury as a whole, and of the other forms of injury preven-
tion and compensation whose existence and character influence the
ways we should think about the proper scope and functions of tort. In
that sense, the book was as much about mass torts as it was about
other, more traditional forms of liability for accidental injury.
In view of what has transpired in tort law and tort litigation dur-
ing the last thirty years, it is evident in retrospect that The Costs of Acci-
dents was published at the beginning of a new era in the history of tort
law-an era in which mass tort litigation figures prominently. The
book constructed an intellectual and conceptual platform from which
thinking about tort liability and new forms of tort litigation could de-
velop. In doing so, the book brought together and advanced our
2. GUIDO CALABREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
3. See, e.g., Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story: An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116, 128 (1968) (noting the "novelty" of mass tort litigation).
4. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
5. See In reA.H. Robins Co., Inc. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 406 F. Supp.
540 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (transferring 57 actions originating in 23 different districts alleging
damages resulting from the use of intrauterine contraceptive devices manufactured by de-
fendants to a centrally located district for pretrial procedures).
6. See generally Naomi Sheiner, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enteiprise Liability, 46 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 963 (1978).
7. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
3 (1986).
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thinking about two very different themes in the history of tort law and
insurance: accident prevention and loss spreading. Once these
themes were brought together, not only academically but also in prac-
tice, tort law thinking could never be the same again.
To understand where Calabresi's thinking fits in the history of
ideas about the relation between liability insurance and accident pre-
vention, I begin by examining how the courts thought about insur-
ance and accident prevention in the period before liability insurance
was introduced in this country, late in the nineteenth century. I then
review the evolution of these ideas in the major debates about tort
reform and insurance that occurred over the next century and a half.
What this review reveals is not a slow and steady evolution of thought.
It is instead a story of basic insights about the relation between liability
insurance and accident prevention that were recognized relatively
early, but that went essentially unappreciated and undeveloped over a
period of many decades, largely because there was such a heavy con-
cern with the compensation of accident victims among those who
thought and wrote about tort liability during this period.
The story begins at a point when the idea of insuring against civil
liability was highly suspect; liability insurance was considered almost
immoral.8 By the late nineteenth century, however, there had been a
decided shift in attitude as the courts began to regard the purchase of
liability insurance as a form of responsible behavior, ensuring that le-
gal obligations could be performed.9 The courts at this point recog-
nized that liability insurance was not necessarily inconsistent with
accident prevention, because of its capacity to vary premiums with the
risk posed by the insured's activities. But this potential received little
attention in the early-twentieth-century debates about the failure of
the tort system adequately to compensate injured workers and auto
accident victims. Rather, it was in these debates that ideas about liabil-
ity insurance as a form of loss spreading, and possibly as a stop on the
road to social insurance against accidental injury, began to emerge.
The mid-century enterprise liability theorists then developed these
loss-spreading ideas. Only when subsequent scholars and policymak-
ers ceased arguing about tort liability and its reform almost exclusively
in social welfare terms, however, and began to think of tort as the
more complex and mixed system that it actually is, was it possible for
insights about the relation between liability insurance and accident
8. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L.
REv. 85, 86 & n.6 (2001) (describing disfavor of liability insurance because of the belief
that it would encourage reckless behavior).
9. E.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312, 324 (1886).
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prevention to play a more significant role than they had until that
time.
I. THE INTRODUCTION AND LEGITIMATION OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
For many decades, we have tended to think of tort liability and
liability insurance as going hand-in-hand. By 1944, this view was so
ingrained that it was possible for Justice Roger Traynor to argue that
one of the principal justifications for the imposition of tort liability on
business enterprises was that these enterprises could purchase insur-
ance against liability and thereby broadly spread injury costs."0 Tray-
nor's view helped to usher in an enterprise liability movement that
was extremely influential during the ensuing decades. Among other
things, it was heavily responsible for the modern law of products
liability.
The connection between tort liability and insurance, however,
had not always been considered as natural or automatic as it seemed
to be by the time Traynor crafted his concurrence in Escola. Tort lia-
bility had existed in various forms long before the advent of liability
insurance. Before liability insurance even existed, when negligence
law began to emerge in its modern form early in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the validity of forms of coverage that seemed to insure against
the consequences of negligence had to be addressed.
A. Intellectual Antecedents: The Barratry Defense and Liability Waivers
What we now understand as liability insurance would not be in-
troduced until the 1880s. Rather, the dominant forms of coverage
during most of the nineteenth century were marine and fire insur-
ance. Both were first-party insurance schemes that covered the policy-
holder against the loss of his own property. Whether and to what
extent the insurance policies providing this coverage should be inter-
preted to cover losses resulting from the policyholder's misfeasance,
however, had been a matter of dispute for some time. The doctrinal
vehicle through which this issue was considered was the barratry de-
fense of the policyholder's negligence, or the defense of barratry.
Speaking of the defense in marine insurance, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court noted that
It is the duty of the owner [of the vessel] to see that he in-
trusts the property insured with a man of competent skill,
prudence, and discretion. He is responsible for all losses or
10. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,J.,
concurring).
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damage to the goods committed to his charge, which arise
from his negligence, ignorance, or willful misconduct ....
The principle of an implied warranty on the part of the as-
sured, that every thing shall be done to prevent a loss, per-
vades the whole subject of marine insurance .... ."
The express question in cases such as this was how coverage lan-
guage that was sufficiently general to be read as insuring against losses
caused by negligence should be interpreted. But the implicit question
was whether encouraging, or at least tolerating, insurance against neg-
ligent conduct was desirable as a matter of public policy. Phillips's
Treatise on the Law of Insurance2 put it this way:
A person cannot protect himself by insurance against
the loss occasioned by his own fraudulent acts and miscon-
duct .... [A] n agreement by one party to indemnify an-
other against losses voluntarily incurred, seems to be so
obviously opposed to the general interest of a community,
that it could hardly be enforced by any legal tribunal. And
there is the same objection, in a smaller degree, against sus-
taining a contract to indemnify a man against the conse-
quences of his own negligence. By such an agreement one
man would consent to put himself wholly in the power of
another, and it could operate only to the injury of the par-
ties, and to the community of which they were members.
1 3
As the middle of the nineteenth century approached, however,
attitudes were evolving. Marine and fire insurers increasingly found
that the defense of barratry was denied to them when they sought to
avoid coverage obligations on the ground that the policyholder's neg-
ligence had caused an otherwise-insured loss.14 The change seems to
have already begun to occur when Kent published the third volume of
his Commentaries5 in 1828: "[I] t is a vexed question, rendered more
perplexing by well balanced decisions, and in direct opposition to
each other, whether a loss by fire proceeding from negligence, be cov-
ered by a policy insuring against fire."16
11. Cleveland v. Union Ins. Co., 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 308, 321-22 (1811); see also Grim v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 13 Johns. 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (holding that fire damage caused by
negligence was not covered under marine insurance); MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 202 (1977) (noting that before 1830, parties were
not insured for losses resulting from their own negligence).
12. WILLARD PHILLIPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (1823).
13. Id. at 158; see also HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 202 (quoting PHILLIPS, supra note 12).
14. E.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 35 U.S. 507, 518 (1836).
15. 3JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1828).
16. Id. at 253-54.
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The decline of the barratry defense was not accompanied by any
explicit recognition that there had been a shift in policy regarding the
risk that such insurance might create "to the injury of the parties, and
to the community of which they were members" that Phillips had de-
scribed. Rather, insurance policies whose literal terms covered losses
caused by negligence were now understood simply to cover what they
said they did.
On the few occasions when the validity of devices that looked like
liability insurance were called into question, however, concern with
the consequences of permitting such insurance was still voiced. For
example, throughout the nineteenth century there was uncertainty
about the extent to which common carriers would be permitted to
contract out of their common-law duties of care to passengers and the
owners of goods that they transported.17 This uncertainty reflected
the tensions between freedom of contract, which grew in importance
within the legal hierarchy of values as the century proceeded, and the
desirability of ensuring protection for the customers of the common
carrier. As late as 1873, the United States Supreme Court agonized
about the issue in the following way:
The question is, whether such modification of responsi-
bility by notice or special contract may not be carried beyond
legitimate bounds, and introduce evils against which it was
the direct policy of the law to guard; whether, for example, a
modification which gives license and immunity to negligence
and carelessness on the part of a public carrier or his ser-
vants, is not so evidently repugnant to that policy as to be
altogether null and void; or, at least null and void under cer-
tain circumstances.' 8
The Court's reference to common carriers' "modification" of
their "responsibility" to the public reflected its concern with what to-
day we would call "moral hazard"-the decreased tendency on the
part of those who are insured to exercise care to avoid loss. Under-
scoring the point, the Court went on to quote a New York decision
expressing concern about the effects of that state's rule permitting
abrogation of a common carrier's duty of high care to its passengers:
"The fruits of this rule," says Judge Davis, "are already being
gathered in increasing accidents, through the decreasing
care and vigilance on the part of these corporations; and
they will continue to be reaped until a just sense of public
17. See HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 204-05.
18. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 360 (1873).
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policy shall lead to legislative restriction upon the power to
make this kind of contracts."' 9
This concern was evidenced not only in connection with the lia-
bility of common carriers to passengers and shippers, but also regard-
ing what amounted to liability insurance hidden in the interstices of
first-party policies themselves. For example, first-party marine insur-
ance against the loss of ships and cargo at sea sometimes covered lia-
bility for the "running down" of one ship by another.2' But this form
of coverage was also subject to the barratry defense of the policy-
holder's negligence, except under unusual circumstances.2 1 An En-
glish court early in the nineteenth century had indicated that "[i]t
would be an illegal insurance to insure against what might be the con-
sequences of the wrongful acts of the assured," but created an excep-
tion where the policyholders were also insurers and were therefore "as
much interested to extend the principle of loss, as to restrain it."' 2 2 As
time went on, however, this kind of rhetoric became less common,
and the overall willingness of the courts to countenance legal arrange-
ments that in one way or another transferred liability risk from one
party to another seemed to increase.2 3
Horwitz attributes the increased acceptance of insurance as the
nineteenth century proceeded to the rise of an actuarial conscious-
ness during this period,24 and it may well be that at this time there was
a transformation in the understanding of both insurance and the
events that insurance covers. On the one hand, the older view was
that insurance was just one of many forms of indemnity in which risk
was merely transferred from one party to another. With the transfer
of risk came the undesirable removal of responsibility from the party
who was transferring it. On the other hand, once insurance began to
be seen as a risk pooling mechanism in which the insurer is the vehi-
cle by which the law of averages can be enlisted to protect both in-
surer and insured, the insurance transaction became more easily
viewed as a means of economic planning and stabilization than as a
device for avoiding common-law responsibilities.
19. Id. at 368 (quoting Stinson v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 32 N.Y. 333, 337 (1865)).
20. Mary Coate McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. Rav. 26,
27 & n.7 (1941).
21. See id. at 32 n.27 (collecting cases in which English courts decided whether the
policyholder could recover when the master or crew were negligent).
22. Delanoy v. Robson, 5 Taunt. 605, 128 Eng. Rep. 827 (1814).
23. HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 203-10.
24. Id. at 226-37.
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In my view, however, the courts had not yet come completely
around to this actuarial way of understanding insurance as the twenti-
eth century approached. Rather, although their conception of insur-
ance was evolving, they continued to be ambivalent about the
connection between insurance (and devices like it, such as indemnity
agreements and liability waivers) and accident prevention. And as we
will see, when the courts came squarely to address the validity of liabil-
ity insurance, their thinking did not seem to be informed by an actua-
rial point of view.
B. The Rise of Liability Insurance
The problematic relation between insurance and "responsibility"
found expression in a number of important late-nineteenth-century
decisions upholding the validity of liability insurance against the con-
tention that permitting insurance for negligence would encourage
negligent conduct. In these decisions, the way the responsibility
theme was expressed and applied began to be transformed.
It was no accident that the courts were not called upon to address
the validity of liability insurance until nearly the dawn of the twentieth
century. Liability insurance was first marketed in the United States in
the 1880s, having been imported from Great Britain, where it was also
a very recent invention.2" The first form of liability insurance cover-
age was "employers' liability insurance," designed to protect employ-
ers against liability to their employees in the era before the enactment
of workers' compensation.26 In short order a "public liability" feature
was added to such policies, a feature that became central after work-
ers' compensation was enacted.27 These policies eventually evolved
into today's commercial liability insurance. 28
The first cases challenging the validity of liability insurance each
involved common carriers. That common carriers would be parties
makes sense for two reasons. First, common carriers such as railroads
and steamships were disproportionately likely to be involved in tort
suits, and therefore likely to be among the first defendants who would
seek to take advantage of their newly purchased liability insurance pol-
icies. Second, because common carriers had a high duty of care, it
was in connection with the purchase of liability insurance by this par-
ticular kind of enterprise that the diminution-of-responsibility argu-
ment against the validity of liability insurance had the greatest chance
25. Abraham, supra note 8, at 87-88.
26. Id. at 87.
27. Id. at 88.
28. Id. at 88-89.
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of succeeding. If enterprises whose conduct was as affected by the
nublic interest as common carriers could validly purchase insurance
that risked diminishing their incentive to comply with their common-
law duty, then other enterprises whose conduct was less affected by
the public interest would surely be permitted to purchase liability in-
surance. The opposition to liability insurance was thus likely to make
its strongest argument in cases involving common carriers.
The first notable attack came indirectly. In Phoenix Insurance Co.
v. Erie & Western Transportation Co., a marine insurer had paid the
shipper of goods for a loss, and brought a subrogation action against
the carrier of the goods.29 The carrier's defense was that because the
contract of carriage gave the carrier the benefit of the shipper's insur-
ance, the insurer had no right of subrogation,30 presumably under the
rule that an insurer cannot have subrogation against its own insured.
3 a
The insurer seems to have contended, among other things, that
providing the carrier with the benefit of the shipper's insurance was
invalid, because it amounted to insuring the carrier against liability for
its own negligence. The case eventually made its way to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, which brushed this contention aside, citing as authority
the earlier decisions abolishing the barratry defense of the policy-
holder's negligence in cases in which the carrier had purchased its
own fire or marine insurance.32 But of course the tension between
responsibility for negligently causing accidents and insuring against
that liability did not automatically disappear, and the Court seemed to
feel compelled to reconcile that tension. It attempted to do so in a
memorable phrase that would heavily influence courts subsequently
addressing the issue: "By obtaining insurance," the Court said, the in-
sured "does not diminish his own responsibility to the owners of the
goods, but rather increases his means of meeting that
responsibility."33
All Phoenix did literally, however, was hold that the barratry de-
fense of the policyholder's negligence was abolished under marine
insurance policies, not only when the claim was made by the named
insured, but also when a party given the benefit of that insurance by
contract was sued by the insurer in its capacity as subrogee of the
named insured. 4 Phoenix itself did not involve liability insurance, and
29. 117 U.S. 312, 312 (1886).
30. Id.
31. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 192 (3d ed. 2000).
32. Phoenix, 117 U.S. at 324-25.
33. Id. at 324.
34. Id. at 323-24.
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the dispute in Phoenix concerned what amounted to indirect insur-
ance against liability for damage to property, not against liability for
personal injury.
It was not long, however, before what we might call the "Phoenix
doctrine" was applied expressly and directly to insurance against liabil-
ity for personal injury. In 1896, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
squarely rejected an attack on the validity of common carrier's liability
insurance, relying on the now well-established applicability of fire and
marine insurance to losses resulting from the policyholder's negli-
gence and citing the Phoenix doctrine as authority for its decision.3 5
The court dismissed the contention that the policy was invalid because
its "inevitable tendency or effect" would be "to induce less vigilance or
to promote greater carelessness" on the part of the policyholder.3 6
Liability insurance, the court said, does not in any way relax the car-
rier's duty of care and vigilance to the public.3 7 This is because insur-
ance is "at best limited and partial" and because the policyholder will
endeavor to reduce the sum total of his insurance to a mini-
mum figure, and thereby diminish the amount of the annual
premium . . . as well as the rate charged him for it, [which]
will always depend in a large measure, if not entirely, upon
the prudence, care, and skill with which his affairs are man-
aged and conducted. Such a carrier has, consequently, ex-
actly the same motive or incentive to protect the public and
the individual from injury that he would have if he should
become his own insurer .... 8
A year later the Supreme Court of NewJersey reached the same result,
employing similar reasoning and also quoting Phoenix.39
Thus, the introduction and judicial acceptance of liability insur-
ance did not signal the demise of the responsibility theme. The Phoe-
nix doctrine openly acknowledged the importance of responsibility.
Phoenix and its progeny simply rejected the contention that there was
anything inconsistent about being discouraged from engaging in neg-
ligent conduct by the threat of liability for the consequences of that
conduct, while simultaneously insuring against such liability.
In Phoenix itself this notion was virtually an ipse dixit without
much reasoning to support it. Merely saying that being insured
35. Boston & A.R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 34 A. 778, 786-87 (Md. 1896).
36. Id. at 786.
37. Id. at 787.
38. Id. at 786, 787.
39. Trenton Passenger R.R. Co. v. Guarantors' Liab. Indem. Co., 37 A. 609, 611 (N.J.
1897).
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against liability for negligence does not, diminish the incentive to be
careful does not make it so. But the Maryland Court of Appeals' ef-
fort to reconcile the tension between responsibility and insurance by
invoking the notion that varying premiums with the amount of "pru-
dence, care, and skill" exercised by the policyholder would maintain
all necessary incentives constituted a more substantive argument and
tended also to be quoted in subsequent decisions.4 °
The new doctrine validating liability insurance was accepted virtu-
ally without objection, both at the time and as time went on. The only
vigorous judicial criticism I have located came a decade later, when
the Supreme Court of Missouri expressly took issue with the Phoenix
doctrine and declined to apply it in Breeden v. Frankfort Marine, Accident
& Plate Glass Insurance Co.4" The court simply could not accept what it
took to be the core of the doctrine, that liability insurance does not
undermine accident prevention:
With all due respect for the opinion of that great court, yet
we challenge the soundness of the logic of certain portions
of the argument advanced and the correctness of the conclu-
sions reached therein regarding this question. In our judg-
ment, when a carrier knows that a third person is required to
furnish the means from his own pocket with which to pay for
the injuries done by his negligence to the passenger, then
that consideration has a direct and potent influence in en-
couraging negligence on the part of the carrier.42
The court then added:
If [liability insurance] does not encourage negligence and
stimulate carelessness in the discharge of the carrier's duties
to the passenger, then I must confess that I am ignorant of
human nature, the general mode of transacting business, the
motives and considerations which prompt the human family
to action, and the powerful influence that self-interest plays
in the affairs of man.4
40. Boston & AR. Co., 34 A. at 787.
41. 119 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1909).
42. Id. at 581.
43. Id. at 585. True to its principles, the court listed a parade of horribles that would
follow if it adhered to the Phoenix doctrine:
If this so-called species of insurance is valid, then by the same course of reasoning
a physician or surgeon may insure against his acts of malpractice, or other negli-
gent acts in the sick room, and act with perfect impunity. And, based upon the
same authorities relied upon by counsel for respondent in this case, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in a recent case, has just held that the owner of an auto-
mobile may insure against all damages he may be compelled to pay to any third
person in consequence of his negligence in operating the same .... Already we
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But the Breeden decision was the dying gasp of an older point of
view. That view saw the common carrier's responsibility as lying in its
duty to exercise care to avoid causing personal injury. In contrast, the
newer point of view saw responsibility differently. When the Phoenix
Court said that, by purchasing liability insurance, the policyholder
"does not diminish his own responsibility ... but rather increases his
means of meeting that responsibility,"" it did not conceive of respon-
sibility as the obligation to avoid negligence. If insurance increases
the policyholder's means of meeting his responsibility, then the re-
sponsibility in question cannot be the obligation not to cause injury,
or the obligation not to be negligent. Whatever one thinks about
whether being insured has a negative impact on safety, almost cer-
tainly the Court was not saying that insurance has a positive impact:
Insurance does not increase the policyholder's means of preventing
accidents.
Insurance does, however, increase the policyholder's means of
paying for the costs of accidents. If this is the increased means of
meeting responsibility to which the Phoenix doctrine was referring,
then the very idea of responsibility has begun to evolve, from responsi-
bility to avoid negligently injuring others, toward responsibility to
compensate for injury when it occurs. Liability insurance is trans-
formed in this evolution into a vehicle for ensuring compensation to
the injured. And once liability insurance also is understood as not
being wholly incompatible with accident prevention, then the seeds of
the modern functioning of liability insurance have been planted.
Nevertheless, it is important to underscore not only what the new
thinking about liability insurance was at this point, but also what it was
not. By the dawn of the twentieth century, the courts were rejecting
the concern that liability insurance would so undermine safety incen-
tives that this new form of insurance was against public policy. And
they had come to see the benefit of liability insurance as a means of
ensuring that the policyholder would be able to compensate those it
tortiously injured-as a means of meeting that responsibility rather
than shirking it. The courts rejecting attacks on liability insurance
consistently emphasized the fact that those purchasing liability insur-
see mere children, almost daily, driving automobiles, with their attending dan-
gers, along our streets at a high rate of speed, from 20 to 35 miles an hour.Would any sensible man suppose for a moment that parents would tolerate that
recklessness for a moment if they were not indemnified against all damages which
might flow from such conduct? Certainly not.
Id. at 584-85.
44. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & Western Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312, 324 (1886).
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ance were not relieving themselves of any obligation to those they in-
Jured. The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted, for example, that
"[n]otwithstanding such insurance, the carrier remains liabie to the
owner or shipper of the goods, and by insuring them he merely con-
tracts, as in every other instance of a reinsurance, with some one else
for reimbursement for such loss."45
But there is nothing in these opinions to suggest that the courts
were thinking in anything other than two-party terms. The common
carrier had a responsibility to compensate those injured by its negli-
gence, and liability insurance helped to assure that such compensa-
tion would be available. There was no reference, however, to the way
in which the purchase would be financed, to the fact that other simi-
larly situated common carriers would also be purchasing insurance, or
to the possibility that shipping costs would rise and that customers as a
group might therefore be footing some of the bill for the carrier's
liability insurance. In short, the courts were not yet speaking about
the loss-spreading effects of liability insurance. In their reasoning
there were no other policyholders in the background or risk-sharing
benefits being taken into account. For these courts, liability insurance
was for all intents and purposes just like an ordinary indemnity that
transfers financial responsibility from one freestanding party to an-
other. It would take another step in the evolution of thinking about
liability insurance before loss-spreading considerations of this sort
would be brought into play.
II. THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION DEBATE
The courts were not the only forum in which the relation be-
tween injury prevention and insurance was being worked through
during this period. In the decade after the Phoenix doctrine found
acceptance in the state courts, a national debate about the proper
method of handling workplace injuries culminated in the enactment
of workers' compensation acts around the country.
4
" The rhetoric
and reasoning in this debate and in the discussions of workers' com-
pensation following its enactment reveal how an incipient conception
of the role of loss spreading first began to figure in the arguments
about the new system.
45. Boston & AA Co., 34 A. at 786; see also Trenton Passenger R.R. Co. v. Guarantors'
Liab. Indem. Co., 37 A. 609, 611 (N.J. 1897) ("The insured is held to the performance of
his duty of vigilance both by his liability notwithstanding the indemnity, and 
by the fact
that the vigilant carrier would obtain better terms in making the contracts of insurance.").
46. At the time, of course, these acts were referred to as "workmen's" compensation,
but I will employ the modern usage that refers to workers without regard to their 
gender.
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The labor movement entered the early years of the debate over
workers' compensation convinced that a tort remedy for employer
negligence, reformed to eliminate or mitigate the "unholy trinity" of
employer defenses (the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence) would serve workers' interests best.47 Witt
argues that concern over the potential loss of traditional employee
control of the workplace influenced this reluctance of labor to sup-
port workers' compensation, which had been enacted in Great Britainin 1897 and in Germany before that.48 Whatever the explanation, la-bor support for workers' compensation fully materialized in 1909,
when Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor came
out in favor of workers' compensation.49
The predominant rationale deployed in favor of workers' com-pensation was that with the employer's control over the workplace
came responsibility for any injury that occurred there.5' There waslittle dispute, of course, that the employer was responsible for injuries
caused by its negligence (perhaps subject to defenses); the crux of thedebate about the wisdom, and indeed the constitutionality, of work-
ers' compensation was whether the law should impose responsibility
on employers for injuries that were not caused by negligence. 5'
The argument made against imposing liability without fault was
that, because there was nothing the employer should have done (andin some cases, could have done) to prevent an injury not caused by its
negligence, imposing liability without fault amounted to a taking ofhis property without due process of law.52 Thus, the argument went,
workers' compensation "does nothing to conserve the health, safety,
or morals of employ[ee]s" and therefore exceeds the police power of
the state. 53 An employer held liable without fault is merely forced toinsure against liability, either directly, or by raising the price of its
47. PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE:
THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 93-94 (2000);John Fabian Witt, Note, The Trans-formation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467, 1497(1998).
48. See Witt, supra note 47, at 1497; see alsoJoHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUB-
LIC 89 (2004) (describing the tension between workers' desire to control the workplace
and the need to characterize the workplace as manager-controlled in order not to under-
mine employers' liability reforms).
49. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 47, at 101; WITr, supra note 48, at 147.
50. See Witt, supra note 47, at 1490.
51. WITr, supra note 48, at 134.
52. Id.
53. Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 442 (N.Y. 1911). For discussion of Ivesand itsbackground, see WITT, supra note 48, at 152-86.
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goods or services, 54 but is not required to do anything to make em-
plovees safer.
The ultimately successful policy and legal response given by pro-
ponents of the legislation was that workers' compensation would in
fact contribute to the health and safety of employees and was there-
fore both a constitutional and sensible exercise of the police power.
The core of the proponents' argument was that neither tort liability
on the part of employers nor insurance privately purchased by em-
ployees-nor a combination of the two-provided adequate compen-
sation for workplace injuries. Workers' compensation, in contrast,
had a better chance of doing so. Ensuring that there was a means of
compensating injured employees who would otherwise be left desti-
tute was sufficient contribution to their health and safety to fall within
the police power of the state. Interestingly, there was much more em-
phasis on this prong of the justification for workers' compensation
than on the notion that moving to what would later be called enter-
prise-based strict liability on the part of the employer might actually
promote accident reduction. In short, workers' compensation wasjus-
tified by its proponents largely on compensation grounds. It was in
this sense a first step in developing a system of social welfare.
55
Two foundational documents in this debate illustrate the charac-
ter of the arguments that flew back and forth. Crystal Eastman's clas-
sic study of industrial accident compensation in Pittsburgh was an
indictment of the deficiencies of the tort system.
56 It demonstrated
that there was a dramatic gap between the losses suffered by workers
and the amounts they recovered in tort, when they recovered at all,
and recommended the adoption of workers' compensation as a substi-
tute for tort. Eastman found that, of the 258 cases involving the work-
place deaths of married men in Pittsburgh during a twelve-month
period in 1906-1907, 164 plaintiffs recovered $500 or less, 59 of whom
recovered nothing.57 Of the 48 who were known to have recovered
more, only 8 received more than $2,000.58 Thus, at most only 30 per-
cent recovered more than $500 for the death of a breadwinner.59
The very fact that Eastman's study focused on the deaths of mar-
ried workers shows how much the overall concern was for compensa-
54. Cf Ives, 94 N.E. at 439 (recognizing this ability of employers to pass on the burden
of liability to an insurer or consumers as a positive aspect of workers' compensation before
holding that the plan was unconstitutional).
55. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 47, at 1-6.
56. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-AccIDENTS AND THE LAW (1910).
57. Id. at 121 tbl.16.
58. Id.
59. Id at 121-22, 121 tbl.16.
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tion that would not leave families destitute, rather than accident
prevention. Otherwise, the deaths of single men (and women) would
surely have been given equal attention. This emphasis was a reflection
of what, in the study as a whole, was a worker-protection theme that
was tinged with paternalism. The employer was seen to have a respon-
sibility for compensating worker injuries both because injured workers
and their families were in need and because the employer was in a
position of control that rendered him responsible for what occurred
in the workplace.6"
Eastman's study focused almost exclusively on the causes of in-
dustrial accidents and the workers' need for compensation. Although
the study contained discussions of accident prevention, for the most
part they merely identified the generic categories of employer negli-
gence whose elimination would reduce accident rates: "lack of provi-
sion for safety in the original construction of the working place, ...
defects in plant or equipment [that] could have been prevented by a
more frequent and careful inspection," etc.6 1 The only arguable ex-
amples of safety improvement that did not involve eliminating em-
ployer negligence were restrictions on the employment of children
and long hours of work.6 2 At only a few points in the book was there
any intimation that imposing liability on the employer for all acci-
dents, whether or not they resulted from negligence, would enhance
accident prevention.6"
Nor was there much reference at all to the potential availability or
impact of insurance against the new form of workers' compensation
liability that Eastman recommended. The assumption throughout was
simply that the employer should bear the costs of accidents. The con-
cern was whether, and if so by how much, these costs would increase if
the tort system were displaced by workers' compensation. There was
substantially less consideration of whether the shift of liability to em-
60. Witt describes this as concern with the "family wage." See WiTr, supra note 48, at
119-20.
61. EASTMAN, supra note 56, at 105.
62. See id. at 105-07.
63. For example, Eastman notes:
And yet, in the face of the unremitting pressure for output, the motive for preven-
tion can never be compelling until to each injury and death is affixed a uniform
and unescapable penalty. If accidents became a heavy and determinable cost to
the business not dependent upon the cleverness of lawyers, the leanings ofjudges, or the sympathies of juries, but directly proportioned to the number ofdeaths and the number and seriousness of injuries among the men on the pay-
roll, then the prevention of them would become of direct economic interest to
the employer.
Id. at 114.
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ployers would reduce accidents and therefore reduce accident costs.
The dominant theme was that the employer would fulfill its responsi-
bility, not necessarily by preventing accidents, but rather by ensuring
compensation to the employee for injuries suffered in the accidents
that do occur.
There was also virtually no consideration given in Eastman's work
to the ultimate distribution of costs that would result from the adop-
tion of workers' compensation. She seemed to recognize that in the
long run the costs of workers' compensation would not necessarily be
paid by the employer. In enumerating the requirements that she be-
lieved a workers' compensation law must satisfy, for example, Eastman
said that "it must shift a considerable share of the burden of each
accident from the family immediately affected to the business, and
thus to the whole body of consumers. '"64 But this assumption that ac-
cident costs would be spread to consumers was never analyzed, and
the benefits of the broad spreading of costs that would result were not
identified as one of the arguments in favor of moving to the new sys-
tem she proposed.
Eastman's work helped to set the stage for the enactment of work-
ers' compensation. But the seminal document in the field was the
Wainwright Commission Report, 65 which made the findings that sup-
ported the earliest noteworthy workers' compensation statute, en-
acted in the State of New York in 1910.66 The Commission, on which
Eastman served, held eleven days of hearings around the state in late
1909 and early 1910.67 It heard testimony from 106 witnesses and pro-
duced a 470-page transcript of this testimony.
6 s
The central concern of this testimony was again the inadequacies
of the tort system and the possible attractiveness of workers' compen-
sation as an alternative. Just as in Eastman's book, the witnesses fo-
cused more on the need for effective compensation of accident
victims than on the potential injury-reduction effect of a move to
workers' compensation. The worker-protection theme again was
64. Id. at 220.
65. REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMISSION AP-
POINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909 To INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS (1910) [hereinafter WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION
REPORT].
66. An Act to Amend the Labor Law, in Relation to Workmen's Compensation in Cer-
tain Dangerous Employments, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. LAWS 1945.
67. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 65, at 4-5.
68. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE ACCOMPANYING THE FIRST REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF
1909 TO INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS (1910).
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dominant. What little reference to insurance against workers' com-
pensation liability one finds in the testimony reflects differences of
opinion about whether premium rates would rise or fall under such
an approach.6" The uncertainty about this issue resulted from the fact
that, although the number of injuries for which compensation was
payable would increase under workers' compensation, the average
amount that would actually be paid per injury might either increase or
decrease.7°
In addition, how successful liability insurance could actually be in
encouraging loss prevention was unclear at this time, despite the anal-
ysis that had persuaded the Maryland Court of Appeals a decade ear-
lier.7 ' Even before the enactment of workers' compensation, the
companies writing employers' liability insurance had understood that
varying premiums in accordance with factors that policyholders could
control might affect safety levels. As early as the turn of the century,
for example, the Travelers Insurance Company was inspecting the
premises of its policyholders and giving them reductions in premiums
for complying with safety standards. 72 But Travelers' own company
history recounts the difficulties it encountered in getting policyhold-
ers to make safety changes. This history quoted one of the early in-
spectors as saying: "We enjoyed little cooperation and much
downright antagonism. The boss had no interest in the elimination of
danger, and the workers themselves had become so used to conditions
that they resisted change ....""
The focus of the Wainwright Commission Report itself largely re-
flected the character of the testimony before the Commission, and the
data on accidents and compensation that the Commission indepen-
dently gathered." There was much emphasis in the Report on the
inadequacies of the compensation received by workers under the tort
system, on the absence of significant sources of insurance to which
employees had access to on their own, on the waste and delay entailed
in the system, and on the antagonism between employers and employ-
69. Id. at 39, 47, 75.
70. Although workers' compensation benefits would be paid on a much less generous
basis than was in principle available in tort, "full" tort damages were often not recovered in
tort. As a consequence, it was uncertain whether actual payouts in workers' compensation
would be larger or smaller than in tort.
71. See Boston & A.R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 34 A. 778, 787 (Md. 1896);
supra text accompanying note 40.
72. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANIES, THE TRAVELERS 100 YEARS 55 (1964).
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 65.
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ees that the system produced. 75 The new system the Commission pro-
posed in the Report would remove these deficiencies by making the
cost of industrial accidents a cost of doing business that would be
passed on to the consuming public. 76 Although there was a passing
reference to the potential of the new system to reduce the incidence
of accidents,7 7 the Report noted at the outset that the Commission
had not yet been able to address the causes and prevention of acci-
dents, promising to address these issues in a subsequent report.7 8
A few passages in the Report, however, also reflected its authors'
awareness that the costs of accidents were likely to be spread broadly if
the new system were enacted. At the outset, the Report indicated that
'Just as employers now fix their selling price with reference to the
costs of replacing and repairing machinery, so we would have them
make an element of the price of the product the cost of relieving in-
jured workers of hazardous industry. '79 Despite its recognition of this
potential loss-spreading effect, the Report made no further reference
to loss spreading until a short passage near the end on the cost of the
proposed system, in which the Report argued that:
If the bridge builder in the State of New York must pay more
to his employees in the shape of damages or compensation
for injuries, that additional cost will be reflected in the total
cost of building the bridges, just as would a rise in wages or a
rise in the cost of materials; but when the law is known the
bridge-builder and the house-builder will make his contracts
accordingly and his prices accordingly, and no man will be
deprived of property or unduly mulcted[.J The community
at large will then support the injured workman by compensa-
tion through the employer in the first instance, rather than
through increased taxes for charity.8"
But when it came time to provide the summary of the Report's
conclusions that was later so famously quoted in Ives, the points that
were highlighted involved the flaws in the existing system, not the
benefits of the proposed new one:
The summary of our investigation on employers' liability
then is:
75. Id. at 19-36.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id. at 5-7.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 67.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
First, that the present system in New York rests on a basis
that is economically unwise and unfair, and that in operation
it is wasteful, uncertain, and productive of antagonism be-
tween workmen and employers.
Second, that it is satisfactory to none and tolerable only
to those employers and workmen who practically disregard
their legal rights and obligations and fairly share the burden
of accidents in industries.
Third, that the evils of the system are most marked in
hazardous employments, where the trade risk is high and
serious accidents frequent.
Fourth, that, as matter of fact, workmen in the danger-
ous trades do not, and practically cannot, provide for them-
selves adequate accident insurance, and therefore, the
burden of serious accidents falls on the workmen least able
to bear it, and brings many of them and their families to
want. 81
Yet in its conclusion the Report once again made a brief argu-
ment based in part on loss spreading: "These results can, we think, be
best avoided by compelling the employer to share the accident bur-
den in intrinsically dangerous trades, since by fixing the price of his
product the shock of the accident may be borne by the community. '8 2
In these brief passages we see the very beginnings of a new ratio-
nale for the imposition of liability, and indirectly a new rationale for
liability insurance: not simply providing a means by which compensa-
tion may be assured, but also a means by which the burden of provid-
ing compensation may be distributed broadly. Commentators writing
at the time similarly made note of, though they did not strongly em-
phasize, this loss-spreading rationale. For example, Francis Bohlen,
one of the leading tort scholars of the period, pointed out what he
seemed to suggest was a distinctly minority view:
There is a further body of public opinion, that of the ad-
vanced collectivist who believes that society as a whole should
share the shock of industrial accidents rather than that it
should be borne by the particular individual whose ill for-
tune it is to suffer it immediately, and so desires to place the
burden primarily upon the employer, who, in theory at least,
can add the cost to the price of his product and so distribute
81. Id. at 68 (quoted in Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 436 (N.Y. 1911)).
82. Id.
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the loss among that part of the community at least whose
wants call his business into existence.83
At this point, then, the loss-spreading rationale for workers' com-
pensation played a secondary role, not only in the reasoning of the
Report of the Wainwright Commission but also in the course of argu-
ments about the constitutionality of workers' compensation. After the
New York statute was enacted, it was challenged and declared uncon-
stitutional in the famous Ives case.84 The New York Constitution was
thereafter amended to authorize workers' compensation,85 a new
(and modified) statute was enacted,86 and the constitutionality of that
statute ultimately was challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court.8
7 In re-
jecting that challenge, the Court held that providing a quid pro quo
in return for expanding the employer's liability was sufficient to avoid
due process and takings concerns.8 8 The Court thus reasoned that it
was not unreasonable for the employer to be required to pay workers'
compensation benefits in return for being relieved of tort liability for
employee injuries. 89 There was no reference in the opinion to the
incentive effects that might be created by the new form of liability or
by insurance against that liability. Nor was there any consideration
given to the loss-spreading effects that liability might generate, as the
Wainwright Commission had predicted, if only briefly. That is, the
Court felt no need to buttress its position by refuting the argument
that imposing liability without fault could not enhance safety, and did
nothing more than shift costs from the employees to the employer.
In summary, although the rudiments of the relationship among
liability, insurance, and accident prevention were understood by the
time that workers' compensation was enacted, the central documents
in the workers' compensation debate that I have examined place this
relationship mainly in the background. The assumption throughout
was that costs would be passed through from the employer to the con-
suming public, and although this was regarded as an advantage, its
significance was not fully appreciated. Even when there was recogni-
tion that varying insurance premiums with the liability experience of
an employer might influence its incentive to take additional safety
83. Francis H. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HDv.
L. REv. 328, 330 (1911).
84. Ives, 94 N.E. at 448.
85. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18.
86. An Act to Re-Enact and Amend the Workmen's Compensation Law, ch. 41, 1914
N.Y. LAws 216.
87. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
88. See id. at 201-02.
89. Id. at 203-04.
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precautions, there was uncertainty about how likely this was to oc-
cur.90 The important thing was that the employer would be held fi-
nancially responsible for employee injuries and that as a consequence
employees would receive some compensation.91 There was also a rec-
ognition that these costs would in some measure ultimately be distrib-
uted more broadly.92 Exactly how, and exactly what impact the system
would have on accident prevention, however, were uncertain and of
less significance than the fact that compensation would take place.
III. THE AUTO ACCIDENT PROBLEM AND THE COLUMBIA PLAN
The next major event in the history of tort reform was the publi-
cation of the Columbia Plan in 1932.9" Proposed by a group of emi-
nent scholars, judges, and lawyers, the Plan envisioned the mandatory
purchase of automobile liability insurance by all owners of motor vehi-
cles, together with the adoption of strict liability for auto-related per-
sonal injuries, the provision of partial compensation for economic loss
but not general damages, and the administrative resolution of dis-
putes.94 The Plan was clearly and expressly based on the workers'
compensation model; not only did it propose imposing strict liability
for auto accidents on those causing the accidents, it also recom-
mended a reduction of compensation to correspond with the expan-
sion of liability and the adoption of a benefit schedule modeled on
the workers' compensation schedule.9" Like the Wainwright Commis-
sion Report, it marshaled an extensive array of statistics in support of
the proposition that there was a substantial accident problem result-
90. For example, in its promised Second Report on the causes and prevention of acci-
dents, submitted after enactment of the workers' compensation statute, the Wainwright
Commission expressed concern that in a highly competitive insurance market, premiums
would not vary sufficiently to create safety incentives. REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF
1909 To INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS: SEC-
OND REPORT 9 (1911).
91. See EASTMAN, supra note 56, at 166 ("A law which leaves the economic burden of
work-accidents wholly upon the workers.., not only does them an injustice, but makes out
of a largely necessary loss an absolutely unnecessary amount of privation.").
92. See id. (arguing that workers' compensation legislation would effect a "more ra-
tional distribution of the loss entailed by [work-accidents]").
93. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS TO
THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1932) [herein-
after COLUMBIA PLAN].
94. Id. at 132-44; see alsoJonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents,
Insurance, and the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919-1941, 4 CONN. INS. LJ.
521, 571-84 (1998) (discussing the Columbia Plan).
95. See COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 93, at 13742. As the Plan noted, "The Committee
has drafted the following schedule of benefits based on the workmen's compensation laws
of New York and of Massachusetts." Id. at 140.
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ing in inadequate compensation of victims.9 6 But the Plan paid little
attention to the possible impact of its adoption on accident preven-
tion, in fact concluding that "compulsory insurance has no demon-
strable effect on accident frequency" and that "[i] f. . . the fear of
personal injury will not restrain careless driving, it is not to be sup-
posed that the fear of having to pay money will do so. " "
The Plan was never enacted anywhere, in part because the advent
of the Depression brought other economic problems to the forefront
of public policy, and in part because there was no consensus that auto
accidents were sufficiently similar to workplace injuries to warrant
treating them in the same way. The debates that followed the debut
of the Plan reveal that the relationships between drivers and passen-
gers, between drivers and pedestrians, and especially between drivers
and other drivers, often were not seen as sufficiently analogous to the
relationship between employers and employees to garner a consensus
in favor of adopting a strict liability approach modeled on workers'
compensation.9" Whereas employers were automatically in a position
to pass on the costs of accidents to the consuming public, most drivers
were individuals who were not driving for business purposes and
could not raise prices in order to cover the increased costs of liabil-
ity.99 The question of which driver was a "cause" of injury in two-vehi-
cle accidents could not be satisfactorily resolved with the same kind of
bright-line rule that enabled workers' compensation to hold the em-
ployer liable as the "cause" of all injuries except those resulting from
the employee's wilful misconduct t0 0 And perhaps most importantly,
the worker-protection rationale that had been so compelling in the
employment context fell flat in the context of motor vehicle accidents.
Whereas workers' compensation had a somewhat paternalistic quality
that critics of the Plan seemed to accept, they could see no basis for a
similar paternalism in the auto accident context.
The most significant innovation proposed by the Columbia Plan
was its use of mandatory liability insurance as the mechanism for as-
96. Id. at 53-96.
97. Id. at 159, 160.
98. Simon, supra note 94, at 579-80 (citing Austin J. Lilly, Compensation for Automobile
Accidents: A Symposium-Criticism of the Proposed Solution, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 803, 805
(1932)).
99. Id.
100. See Lilly, supra note 98, at 805 (contrasting the employer-employee relationship,
characterized by contractual arrangements between members of two distinct and separate
classes, with the relationships between persons affected by the proposed compulsory auto-
mobile compensation law, who have no contractual relationships with each other, and who
may belong to the same or different classes).
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suring victim compensation."' At this point only a handful of states
required drivers to be insured. What the Phoenix Court had seen as a
virtue, the Plan made a necessity. Unlike employers, most drivers
were not capable of paying compensation on their own; insurance was
a necessary feature of the Plan if it were to fill the compensation gap.
The insurance requirement was thus simultaneously a method of as-
suring victim compensation and of imposing the kind of responsibility
for injury that Phoenix had conceived of more than a generation ear-
lier. By mandating the purchase of liability insurance, the Plan did
not diminish individual responsibility, but (in the language of the
Phoenix doctrine) increased each driver's "means of meeting that
responsibility."1"'
But there was a notable conflict between the reasoning behind
the Plan and the reasoning of its critics. Although the Plan itself was
devoid of any reference to the loss spreading that would result from
the compulsory liability insurance it proposed, supporters of the Plan
made it clear that this was one of its advantages. 10 3 The mandatory
insurance requirement was a method of rendering individual drivers
analogous to employers. By purchasing insurance, each driver passed
along the cost of the injuries he or she caused to a pool composed of
all other drivers. The cost of injuries was thereby collectivized. Young
B. Smith, Dean of the Columbia Law School, argued that
The fact that employers and employees constitute sepa-
rate and distinct classes, whereas frequently the victims of
motor car accidents are also motorists, does not differentiate
the cases for purposes of risk distribution. Workmen's com-
pensation laws would be no less effective in spreading losses
resulting from injuries to workers even though there were
large numbers of men who, simultaneously, occupied the po-
sition of employer in one enterprise and the position of em-
ployee in another. Likewise, the fact that a motorist, who is
required to insure against injuries caused others by his car,
may himself be injured by another's car, does not affect the
distribution of risks resulting from the operation of automo-
biles so long as all motorists are required to insure.'0 4
Praising the Plan, Smith wondered whether it, "as did [the report] of
the Wainwright Commission, foreshadow[ed] an impending develop-
101. COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 93, at 138.
102. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312, 324 (1886).
103. Young B. Smith, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium-The Problem and
Its Solution, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 785, 791 (1932).
104. Id. at 792.
[VOL. 64:573
2005] LIABILITY INSURANCE AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION 597
ment in the law looking towards a more scientific distribution of inevi-
table risks which are incident to an important and necessary activity in
modern society.
1 1 5
The Director of Study for the Plan made a similar point:
The problem is how to distribute the losses caused by auto-
mobile accidents in a way best suited to the public welfare.
Conceivably, the losses may be allowed to rest where they
first fall, that is on the victim of the accident and often on his
family... or they may be partly shifted to the shoulders of
the motorist or of his insurance carrier under a scheme of
liability for negligence; or they may be shifted, under a com-
pensation scheme, to the motorists as a class or to all the
taxpayers.1
0 6
He concluded, "If a compensation plan can be administered so as to
spread losses as I have suggested, I believe that we should adopt it."107
To critics of the Plan, however, drivers simply were not in a posi-
tion that was analogous to the position of employers, and liability in-
surance could not make them so.' 0 8 However serious the auto injury
problem might be, the almost paternalistic, worker-protection aspect
of workers' compensation could not be transposed to the auto con-
text. For example, the General Counsel of the Maryland Casualty
Company argued that employers and employees constituted "equally
separate and distinct" classes so that
one distinct and separate class is responsible (theoretically)
for the conditions which produce accidents, and the other
distinct and separate class is the victim of the accident. Em-
ployers do not claim compensation against workmen ...
Nor is consideration given to the fact that employers who do
the paying under workmen's compensation, in theory at
least, have the money with which to pay,-money produced
by the operations which caused the accident and the result-
105. Id. at 786. For this reason, Smith thought that the Plan should have gone even
further:
If the purpose of changing the present bases of risk distribution in the case of
motor car accidents is to spread the losses thereby incurred over a larger group in
the community, by placing upon motorists a more equitable share of the burden
than is the case under existing law, one hesitates in approving a scale of compen-
sation which falls so far short of accomplishing this result.
Id. at 801.
106. Shippen Lewis, The Merits of the Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 583, 588 (1936).
107. Id. at 589.
108. See Lilly, supra note 98, at 804 (arguing that the analogy between workers' compen-
sation and auto accident insurance "affords neither precedent or justification").
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ing loss to the victim; and thus the cost of payment can be
readily absorbed by industry and distributed amongst all
those who have to do with industry and its products or ser-
vice, including the recipients of the payments.1
0 9
Disputing the workers' compensation analogy, another critic
pointed out that "[u] nder the workmen's compensation laws the em-
ployer is liable 'regardless of fault' only to his own employees and
while they are acting within the scope of their employments, subject to
his orders, whereas, under this plan a motorist would be liable to
strangers whatever they might be doing."110 The Plan would there-
fore "amount to a wholesale shifting of the major responsibility for the
economic consequences of wrongdoing on the highways from the
wrongdoers to the unoffending. The insurance would merely disguise
and mitigate the consequences of this underlying vice."1 11
What was being contested here was not just the practical difficulty
entailed in determining ex ante who would be an injurer and who a
victim, which the Plan handled in a somewhat wooden though none-
theless workable fashion. 1 2 More importantly, there was opposition
in principle to the very idea of using insurance to conflate, and render
irrelevant, the categories of injurer and victim. For supporters of the
Plan, auto liability insurance was a way of financing the proposed strict
liability obligation to pay compensation that could otherwise not have
been financed. It was a way of assuring that there would be compensa-
tion for auto injuries. Compulsory insurance rendered feasible a form
of liability that might not otherwise have been sensible to adopt. But
for the critics, liability insurance could be an appropriate method of
financing liability only if the form of liability that it financed was oth-
erwise justified. Adding a compulsory liability insurance component
to the Plan could notjustify imposing strict liability; this form of liabil-
ity had to be independently justified, and in the critics' view this justi-
fication could not be given. The dispute was thus over the extent to
which an auto liability regime should function as a method of ensur-
ing compensation for the injuries that would inevitably result from use
of the automobile. It is no surprise, therefore, that the role that liabil-
ity insurance might actually play in influencing the level of those inju-
109. Id. at 805.
110. P. Tecumseh Sherman, Grounds for Opposing the Automobile Accident Compensation
Plan, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 598, 600 (1936).
111. Id. at601.
112. The Columbia Plan's solution was to hold each driver liable for the other's injuries,
and to hold the other drivers in multi-vehicle accidents jointly and severally liable. COLUM-
BIA PLAN, supra note 93, at 139.
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ries had to take a back seat, so to speak, as a result of the more salient
dispute over the compensation goals of the Plan.
IV. THE ERA Or ENTERPRISE LIABILITY THEORY
The period between the publication of the Columbia Plan and
the mid-1960s was dominated by thinking about enterprise-based
strict liability. Two different sources of thinking about liability insur-
ance during this period are worth examining. In the first group are
the enterprise liability theorists themselves-tort law scholars and
judges who thought and wrote about this issue. In the second group
are insurance law scholars and insurance specialists who, while they
tended not to write about enterprise liability, can provide a glimpse
into contemporaneous thinking on the insurance side of the tort law-
insurance divide.
A. The Tort Law Perspective
Both workers' compensation and the Columbia Plan influenced
the next generation of reform advocates, the most prominent among
them being the enterprise liability theorists Fleming James and Roger
Traynor. 
11 3
James conducted a scholarly campaign in the 1940s and 1950s
that attacked the fault standard and recommended a variety of
changes that would promote broader distribution of the costs of acci-
dental injury.' 1 4 He regarded tort liability "as a means for distributing
losses over society as a whole or some fairly large segment of it."' 15 He
argued that "some good accrues from the fact of distribution itself,"
because "consistent distribution of losses over a large group tends to
substitute (through the operation of the law of large numbers), a cer-
tain and calculable cost for the uncertain risk of ruinous losses to indi-
viduals." '116 For James, the ultimate goal was the adoption of social
insurance: "The full blessings of distribution can best be attained by
comprehensive social insurance, but some measure of advantage may
be had within the present framework of our law of torts, for many of
113. For discussion of the enterprise liability movement, see VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & ED-
MUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY:. RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995).
114. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellec-
tual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 470-83 (1985) (summarizing
James' views of the tort system).
115. See Fleming James, Jr., Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54
HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1156 (1941).
116. Id.
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its rules tend in practice to shift losses to agencies which can and do
distribute them."
'1 17
James thus picked up the compensatory impulse that lay at the
heart of the Columbia Plan and gave it a rationale that had been at
most inchoate in the Plan itself: net social gain would result from loss
spreading. In one of his only two articles on insurance itself, James
argued at the outset that the best way to assure accident victims com-
pensation is "to distribute the losses involved over society as a whole or
some very large segment of it. Such a basis for administering losses
may be called social insurance." '118 James used this term in different
ways. Sometimes he seems to have meant insurance that was financed
out of general revenues,11 9 and sometimes he considered activity-
based liability insurance that happened to spread costs broadly to be
"social insurance."' 2 ° Consequently, it is difficult to know how clearly
James recognized the difference between the cost-internalization/ac-
cident prevention potential of enterprise-based strict liability, perhaps
linked with liability insurance, and broadly loss-distributive social in-
surance that was likely to be without much cost-internalization poten-
tial. Since he was extremely skeptical of the accident prevention
potential of tort liability anyway, the advantages of broad risk distribu-
tion took priority.121 In his article about the impact of liability insur-
ance on accident law he devoted only two paragraphs to the
adjustment of premium rates to create safety incentives, part of which
concentrated on the limitations of this device.' 22 His focus was the
expansion of liability in order to promote loss spreading, whether or
not this resulted in additional accident prevention.
Traynor, in contrast, focused much more clearly on activity-re-
lated liability insurance in developing the argument for enterprise-
based strict liability, and was more sanguine than James about the
prospect that enterprise liability would promote accident preven-
117. Id. at 1157.
118. Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57
YALE L.J. 549, 550 (1948). The other article, Fleming James, Jr. &John V. Thornton, The
Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAw & CorEMP. PROBS. 431 (1950), is mainly
concerned with the way in which expansion in various forms of insurance coverage had
promoted expansion in the scope of tort liability.
119. SeeJames, supra note 118, at 550 (characterizing social insurance as a basis for ad-
ministering losses over society as a whole).
120. See id. at 562-63 (discussing social insurance in the context of liability insurance).
121. See id. at 569 ("As for the branch of the law which is concerned with civil damages
or their equivalent, it is doubtful whether it contributes very much to accident
prevention.").
122. Id. at 560-61.
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tion. 123 His concurrence in Escola, which eventually served as the in-
tellectual foundation for the adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A, argued for product manufacturers' strict liability on the
grounds that manufacturers were both in the best position to mini-
mize the risk of injury to product consumers and to insure against that
risk. 124 But these two strands of argument were at this point incom-
pletely distinct-the passages in which Traynor discusses them move
back and forth between the injury-reduction and insurance arguments
without seeming to recognize that they are logically independent.
Product manufacturers might be superior injury reducers, superior in-
surers, or both, but because Traynor seems to have thought that in
fact they were both, he did not need to distinguish carefully between
these two capacities. Two decades later, writing for a majority that was
adopting enterprise liability rather than arguing for it in a concur-
rence, he gave the insuring function no express reference at all and
was content to cite himself and James, along with Prosser, as sources
for the arguments in favor of strict products liability.
125
James, Traynor, and a number of other scholars moved more ex-
plicitly during this era than ever before beyond the Phoenix concep-
tion of liability insurance-as a means of meeting the responsibility to
provide compensation-and toward the fully modern view of liability
insurance as a means of spreading lOSS. 1 2 6 Their arguments for enter-
prise liability were based on a combination of the desirability of ensur-
ing compensation, the benefits of greater loss spreading, and (for
some of the theorists) the possibility of more effective accident reduc-
tion. But it took time for the full complement of goals to be teased
out of their arguments, in part because they were one-directional.
Neither James nor Traynor, for example, spent much effort identify-
ing the situations in which enterprise liability would not make sense.
A last, though less well-known, piece of scholarship that emerged
at the end of this period illustrates this tendency. Robert Morris's En-
terprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Fore-
123. Traynor's role as a tort theorist more generally is discussed in G. EDWARD WHITE,
TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTuAL HISTORY 180-210 (expanded ed. 2003).
124. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
125. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (citing Escola,
150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring); 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 28.15-28.16, at 1569-74 (1956); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960)).
126. See, e.g., L.W. Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of
Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 805 (1930); Leon Green, The Individual's Protection Under Negli-
gence Law: Risk Sharing, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 751 (1953).
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sight, 12 7 was published in the very issue of the Yale Law Journal in which
Guido Calabresi's first piece of torts scholarship appeared in 1961.128
Morris argued that, contrary to what some earlier scholars had ar-
gued, there was no need to limit enterprise liability to events that are
in some sense foreseeable to the responsible enterprise, because the
actuarial process that leads to insurance against tort liability makes
that unnecessary.29 Because of the way in which policyholders posing
similar risks are grouped together for purposes of premium rating,
and because the occurrence of low-probability events contributes in
only a minor way to the fixing of these rates, enterprises will not have
much incentive to react to the prospect of liability for such events,
whether they are "foreseeable" or not. Further, unless a certain form
of accident becomes part of a pattern that repeats itself with actuarial
significance, liability insurance rates are unlikely to take this type of
accident into account in any important way and are therefore unlikely
to influence policyholder behavior.1 3 ° The article by Morris thus
seemed to confirm what earlier and more prominent scholars such as
James especially had been saying: that liability insurance should be
regarded primarily as a method of loss spreading, and not as a device
that figures in any significant way in loss prevention.
B. The Perspective of Insurance Professionals and Insurance Law Scholars
The story among insurance specialists and insurance law scholars
during the enterprise liability period differs somewhat from the way
that tort theorists were addressing the relation between liability insur-
ance and accident prevention. But the ultimate message that we can
derive from their thinking is not far from what we saw prevailed
among torts scholars and reformers. Insurance lawyers and insurance
law scholars made virtually no reference to the relation between liabil-
ity insurance and accident prevention in their work over a period of
many decades. Whatever they may have known or assumed about the
impact of liability insurance rating on accident prevention, this func-
tion did not figure in what they chose to address in their scholarly
work. In contrast, insurance professionals and business scholars un-
derstood that insurance premium rating had the potential to influ-
127. C. Robert Morris, Jr., Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
128. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499 (1961) [hereinafter Risk Distribution].
129. See Morris, supra note 127, at 574-77.
130. Id. at 595.
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ence accident prevention, but they tended to discount the importance
of this function.
From the beginning and virtually across the board, insurance law
scholars were apparently unconcerned with the impact of liability in-
surance on accident prevention. For example, William Reynolds
Vance, an important insurance lawscholar of the early twentieth cen-
tury who taught at George Washington and Yale, published a "horn-
book" 1 and more focused law review articles 32 that offered only a
cursory consideration of liability insurance. The first edition of
Vance's hornbook, published just after the turn of the century, con-
tained 609 pages of text, of which only the last five pages were devoted
to liability insurance. 133 Unsurprisingly, there was no mention of acci-
dent prevention. Moreover, even an expanded second edition, pub-
lished more than twenty-five years later during the beginning of the
enterprise liability era, still treated liability insurance only in passing
and, again, contained no mention of accident prevention."'
Nor did the passage of time affect matters. A 1957 treatise on
insurance law by Edwin Patterson, Cardozo Professor ofJurisprudence
at Columbia Law School and former Deputy Superintendent of Insur-
ance for the State of New York, contained no reference at all to the
relation between liability insurance premium rates and accident pre-
vention. 135 Fourteen years later, the first edition of Keeton's widely
used insurance law hornbook contained a bare two paragraphs that
made only glancing reference to the subject. 136
I do not mean to suggest that none of these scholars was aware
that liability insurance premiums could be and often were varied with
the levels of risk posed by policyholders, or that changes in risk levels
within the control of policyholders might affect premiums. On the
contrary, undoubtedly they were well aware of these practices. In-
deed, by the time Keeton wrote his insurance law treatise he had al-
ready co-authored an important book on no-fault auto insurance that
analyzed this very potential in the context of the auto accident prob-
lem. 137 Rather, for the most part, these scholars appear to have re-
131. WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE (1904).
132. E.g, William R. Vance, The History of the Development of the Warranty in Insurance Law,
20 YALE L.J. 523 (1911).
133. VANCE, supra note 131, at 604-09.
134. WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 912-18 (2d ed. 1930).
135. See generally EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW: AN OUTLINE OF
LEGAL DOCTRINES IN THEIR RELATIONS TO INSURANCE PRACTICES (2d ed. 1957).
136. See ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 566-67 (1971).
137. See ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 371-73 (1965).
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garded the issue as being beyond the purview of insurance law as a
distinct subject. They were writing about insurance law doctrines and
(later in the period) the policy implications of these doctrines, not
about the functions of insurance within the tort system or within the
broader system of social welfare in which tort liability and workers'
compensation might be regarded as playing a part. The result was
that they had no reason to explore or analyze the impact on or poten-
tial influence of liability insurance on accident prevention.
On the other hand, turning to the insurance professionals and
scholars, the picture is a bit different. They were aware of the capacity
of liability insurance to affect accident prevention, but skeptical about
it. Writing fifteen years after workers' compensation was adopted in
New York, the authors of the leading treatise on the subject seemed to
appreciate the accident prevention potential of the interaction be-
tween workers' compensation and insurance. 138 They first noted that
"[i]ndustry should bear the cost [of work-related injury] initially so
that it may be stimulated and encouraged to reduce it by removing
the causes of injury .... [T]he industry having the lowest injury ratio
will have a lowered cost of production and will, therefore, be at a de-
cided advantage over its competitors." '139 While this seemed to be a
reference to differences across industries rather than among compa-
nies within a particular industry, there followed a later chapter on
"merit rating" that extolled the virtues of varying premiums with the
degree of risk posed by the policyholder: "By placing a penalty upon
the risk which is worse than the average of its class, and by rewarding
policyholders for their efforts in prevention in direct ratio to the re-
sults produced as measured by the improvement in the conditions of
individual risks, merit rating commercializes safety."14 °
Also in the period between the wars, Albert Mowbray, an actuary
and Professor of Insurance at the University of California, published a
general text on insurance as part of the McGraw-Hill Insurance series
that included works by such well-known legal figures as John Alan Ap-
pleman and Edwin Patterson.14 Mowbray's book contained a short
chapter devoted entirely to the topic "prevention of loss.142 Most of
the chapter, however, addressed generic safety measures such as the
138. G.F. MICHELBACHER & THOMAS N. NiAL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE
(1925).
139. Id. at 82.
140. Id. at 301.
141. ALBERT H. MOWBRAY, INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1937).
142. Id. at 32-44.
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founding of Underwriters Laboratories, the development of fire pre-
vention devices, and the value of safety inspections.' 4 ' Only when he
came to discuss workers' compensation did Mowbray include a few
sentences about the provision of rate reductions for reducing the risk
of loss. 44
Among insurance specialists, awareness of this potential for liabil-
ity insurance rating to promote accident prevention persisted in the
coming decades, but it continued to take a back seat to other con-
cerns. Thus, writing for a largely legal audience shortly after World
War II, C.A. Kulp of the Wharton School-author of a leading busi-
ness school textbook on insurance14 5-put the relation between pre-
mium rates and accident prevention in the following way:
Finally, a rate may be expected to encourage the reduc-
tion of loss. Sound insurance principle requires, however,
that this objective be kept clearly secondary to those of eq-
uity and adequacy. Insurance after all is a device to pool risk
and share losses. To the extent that the insurer can soundly
and fairly combine provision of safety incentives with this
fundamental purpose of insurance, very good. But the con-
dition definitely limits the role of the rate as a safety
incentive. 
146
Admittedly, these are just a few examples of formally published
works, not the views of insurance executives or agents working out in
the field in actual insurance practice. In future work I hope to ex-
amine some of the more informal sources reflecting the views of such
individuals. But in a sense the views of the scholars and professionals
who engaged in formal publication were likely to be more influential
on the making of policy and the evolution of attitudes toward poli-
cymaking than those who worked in the trenches of the insurance
business. After all, I am concerned here not with the enactment of
any particular piece of legislation that might have been more influ-
enced by practical considerations than by academic thinking, but
rather with the evolution of ideas about the relation between liability
143. Id. at 35-41.
144. See id. at 41-42 ("Rate reductions can be brought about only by reduction in hazard,
and definite schedules, allowing rate reductions for better than average conditions and
requiring penalties for poorer conditions, are in use in some states. Insurance rates are
modified in accordance with the losses experienced on individual risks.").
145. C.A. KULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE (1928); C.A. KULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE: AN ANALY-
SIS OF HAZARDS, POLICIES, COMPANIES AND RATES (rev. ed. 1942); C.A. KULP, CASUALTY IN-
SURANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF HAZARDS, POLICIES, INSURERS AND RATES (3d ed. 1956).
146. C.A. Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance-Goals, Technics,
and Limits, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 493, 494 (1950).
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insurance and accident prevention. Whether or not these ideas
originated with legal and insurance scholars, it was in their work that
the intellectual foundations of change would have been located. In
any event, I am reasonably confident that the flavor of my brief survey
is substantially accurate. Those who worked in insurance for a living
or studied and wrote about the insurance business were aware that
liability insurance premiums varied with risk levels, but considered the
effect of such variation on safety to be a secondary concern.
In short, by about 1960, in both academic circles and in the
courts, liability insurance was regarded mainly as a method of spread-
ing the risk of loss. No longer was it merely a method by which a
potentially liable party obtained the capacity to "meet its responsibil-
ity" to compensate those it injured. And the potential in theory for
liability insurance to promote safety was also recognized by insurance
specialists. But perhaps because there was considerable skepticism
about the prospects for making use of this capacity, there was no re-
fined analysis of the way in which liability insurance premium rating
could promote safety, or of the way in which the tension between loss
spreading and accident prevention played out in practice. Even after
enterprise liability theory and insurance law scholarship were fully de-
veloped, the role played by ideas about liability insurance in tort and
tort-reform theory was limited and simplistic, in part because enter-
prise liability was seen so heavily as a method of ensuring the compen-
sation of victims by spreading loss in broad channels of distribution.
C. The Transition of the 1960s
It was in the decade of the 1960s that legal scholars began to
make the transition to a more sophisticated way of thinking about the
relation between liability insurance and accident prevention. The
principal, though not exclusive, catalyst for this transition was a re-
newed debate about the proper method of handling auto accidents.
Critics of the tort system once again noted the series of flaws in the
manner that tort handled auto accidents that the Columbia Plan had
identified a generation earlier, and argued that substituting other
methods of compensating the victims of auto accidents would be a
superior approach.'4 7 The publication of Guido Calabresi's first arti-
cle after he began teaching occurred at the very beginning of this pe-
147. Although there was a growing literature on the problem prior to the mid-1960s,
two of the major treatments of the problem appeared at mid-decade. See ALFRED F. CON-
ARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964); KEETON & O'CONNELL,
supra note 137.
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riod.1 48 Although the article was not addressed directly to the auto
accident problem, it provided support for these critics, among other
things by laying out a more refined way of analyzing arguments for
and against enterprise liability than had previously been available.
The first major response to the proponents of auto liability re-
form came in 1965 in a book by Blum and Kalven.14 9 Their argument
consisted heavily of analysis and criticism of the various alternatives to
the fault system. Those proposing alternatives had argued, among
other things, that the fault system failed to deter negligent driving, at
least in part because of widespread insurance against liability. In prac-
tice, auto liability insurance largely disregarded individual fault, set-
ing premiums by reference to broad actuarial categories and settling
cases for reasons of expedience. To make their argument work, there-
fore, Blum and Kalven had to show that the fault system's interaction
with auto liability insurance did not necessarily doom that system.
Their strategy was to imagine an ideal, alternative way of pricing
insurance against liability based on fault, and to argue that if that ideal
were adopted, the fault system would be preferable to the alternatives
being proposed to replace it. They readily recognized that, at the
time, "liability insurers in allocating costs among the insured ap-
pear[ed] to think in strict liability terms."1 5 ° However, instead of fol-
lowing this recognition where it seemed to lead-toward some form
of nonfault liability-they argued that it would be better to improve
the way in which liability insurance was priced so that it did differenti-
ate based on driver fault."' In view of the secondary importance that
we have seen earlier scholars and writers attach to premium rating as a
method of accident prevention, this was a significant proposal, pecu-
liar though it may have been as a way of defending the fault system.
It was at this point that Calabresi entered the debate, in three
articles that presaged a number of points that he would develop much
further in The Costs of Accidents. For our purposes here, it is sufficient
to say that he began in these articles to analyze how the refinement
and degree of subcategorization of insurance affects the interaction
between loss spreading and accident reduction.15 2 In these pieces he
argued that both the existing tort system and tort reform inevitably
148. Calabresi, Risk Distribution, supra note 128.
149. WALTERJ. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW
PROBLEM: AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (1965).
150. Id. at 66.
151. Id. at 66-67.
152. Guido Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 443-45 (1968); Guido Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Won-
derful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216, 225-32 (1965) [hereinafter World of Blum
2005]
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pursue a mix of goals. There could be neither maximum accident
prevention nor maximum loss spreading in systems that pursued
both. 153 These and other justice-related goals would have to be opti-
mized in mixed systems that compromise each goal in service of the
proper combination of them all. Criticizing reform proposals, as
Blum and Kalven had, on the ground that they did not maximize a
particular one of these different goals, simply ignored the fact that
loss spreading, accident prevention, and other values are inevitably in
tension.' 54 The proper task of the tort theorist was to understand how
these values interacted and to analyze the consequences of the differ-
ent possible interactions. The stage was thus set for a full-blown analy-
sis of the relation among these values.
V. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MODERN ERA oF TORT LAW
That analysis emerged in 1970, with the publication of The Costs of
Accidents. At its most general level, the book is about the relation be-
tween deterrence and loss spreading-between what Calabresi calls
primary and secondary accident cost avoidance. 55 He was highly crit-
ical of the way the fault system pursued these goals and his analysis
strongly implied that in certain contexts enterprise-based strict liabil-
ity would be superior. 156 But he moved beyond the limits of the ear-
lier enterprise liability theorists' thinking by recognizing that liability
insurance figured not only in the loss-spreading function of tort liabil-
ity but also in the accident prevention function, 5 7 and by identifying
contexts in which enterprise liability might and might not be the most
effective means of achieving these goals.' 58 His economic approach
to analyzing the problem almost inevitably brought consideration of
the relationship between liability insurance and accident prevention
into play.
Early in the book, Calabresi discussed the different approaches to
loss spreading, one of which is of course insurance, including liability
insurance. 159 In these slightly more than a dozen pages, Calabresi de-
veloped a framework for thinking about the role that insurance can
play in mediating between the two somewhat inconsistent goals of tort
and Kalven]; Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713, 720-34 (1965) [hereinafter The Decision for Accidents].
153. E.g., Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 152, at 744-45.
154. Calabresi, World of Blum and Kalven, supra note 152, at 221-22.
155. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 2, at 26-27.
156. E.g., id. at 50-54.
157. Id. at 54.
158. Id. at 52-54.
159. Id. at 46-54.
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liability, reducing accidents, and spreading the costs of those acci-
dents that occur. Of course the book was about far more than liability
insurance, which figures directly in the analysis at only a few points.
But as I noted earlier, some of the enterprise liability theorists had
tended to think of insurance as being wholly unrelated to accident
prevention; the insurance law scholars had been indifferent to and
therefore disregarded the relation between liability insurance and tort
liability; and, although insurance professionals understood how insur-
ance premium rating occurred, tort law theory was beyond the scope
of their interest as well.
In his discussion, Calabresi brought together a combination of
insights that were significant advances over earlier thinking about lia-
bility insurance. He explained how it is that the extent to which insur-
ance spreads risk is a function of the degree of differentiation among
different categories of insureds in the setting of premium rates.
160
The less differentiation, the more spreading. The more differentia-
tion there is, the less loss spreading occurs but the greater the poten-
tial for accident reduction even though liability for losses is insured.161
He further explained why private insurance may generate what is re-
garded as insufficient loss spreading because of the cost of construct-
ing insurance categories, people's inability to value risk properly, their
lack of incentive to purchase insurance if they have limited assets, and
different parties' differential ability to insure.
162
When this insurance analysis was combined with Calabresi's more
general analytical framework, it provided a systematic basis for think-
ing about the role that liability insurance can play in tort law. In a
sense, what Calabresi did was substantially refine and advance the con-
ception of liability insurance as a device that was potentially consistent
with accident prevention that had been absent from tort law thinking
since just before the time of workers' compensation. Because so
much of the ongoing debate about tort reform during the ensuing
years had been concerned with the role that tort might play in filling
the injury compensation gaps in existing forms of social welfare pro-
tection, this conception of liability insurance had long been dormant.
But Calabresi reinvigorated it.
This moment in intellectual history coincided with developments
in the world of insurance that highlighted the practical importance of
Calabresi's thought. Calabresi showed that both injurers and victims
160. Id. at 47.
161. Id. at 46.
162. Id. at 56-59.
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are potentially in a position to take actions that will contribute to acci-
dent prevention, and that both injurers and victims are potentially in
a position to take actions that will spread the losses associated with the
accidents that do occur. But this was not a merely theoretical possibil-
ity. By 1970, potential victims were actually acquiring the means of
becoming effective spreaders of at least some of the costs of accidents.
For example, Medicare had been introduced in 1965, and employ-
ment-based group health insurance was becoming available to signifi-
cant portions of the American population. Given the rise of these and
other forms of victim-based loss spreading, it is no surprise that acci-
dent prevention would come, to play a larger role in thinking about
tort liability, and that the relation between liability insurance and acci-
dent prevention would seem more significant than it had during the
period when injurer-based loss spreading had seemed to be the princi-
pal means by which this goal might be achieved.
This change of emphasis was certainly reflected in the mass tort
cases that began to. be filed in the decade after publication of The Costs
of Accidents. Mass tort defendants have tended to be large corporate
enterprises with a high volume of loss and a statistically reliable base
of loss experience.163 In a mass tort setting the potential defendant's
liability insurance premiums are therefore likely to be much more
nearly proportional to the degree of risk posed by its activities than in
the sporadic accident context.' Consequently, the argument that
the mass tort defendant's access to insurance would mitigate its acci-
dent prevention incentives would tend to be weaker than in most
other tort settings. Conversely, potential victims' access to their own
insurance would tend to de-emphasize the loss-spreading effect of im-
posing mass tort liability, since both victims and injurers would be at
least somewhat adequate loss spreaders. But health insurance and
other victims-insurance premiums are not at all differentiated with re-
spect to the risk of suffering the kinds of injury or disease associated
with mass tort. Consequently, in this respect the accident prevention
incentives created by allocating costs to victims would likely be mini-
mal. And potential victims are not nearly as effective spreaders of the
risk of suffering wage loss as a result of mass torts, because insurance
against such loss is much less widespread than health insurance. In
short, it is no surprise that as the years went on, because of their acci-
dent prevention capacities, the injurers in mass tort settings were so
often considered superior bearers of the risk of loss-"cheapest cost
163. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855 (1984).
164. I. 'at 854-55.
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avoiders," in Calabresi's terms. And even when they were not, the ar-
gument against imposing liability also often was based on the analyti-
cal framework that Calabresi had developed.'
65
The rise of mass tort liability thus occurred only after the earlier
thinkers' preoccupation with ensuring the compensation of victims
was finally displaced by a more sophisticated approach that weighed
deterrence more heavily and took the availability and functioning of
insurance into account in that calculus. The availability of victim in-
surance prompted some commentators, and undoubtedly some courts
as well, to focus even more heavily on the deterrent effect of the
threat of liability, leaving the compensation and loss-spreading goals
to be addressed through victim insurance. 66
At the same time, the growth of health (and to a lesser extent,
disability) insurance may well have provided victims with sufficient
compensation for the immediate costs of injury to enable them to
maintain lawsuits that would have been settled in the past. In this
sense health and disability insurance may have enhanced the "staying
power" of plaintiffs in a manner analogous to providing them with
access to the capital market to finance their lawsuits.16 7 Paradoxically,
instead of reducing the importance of tort, the growth of these forms
of insurance may be helping to fuel its expansion.
Even apart from mass tort issues, subsequent scholarship has built
on Calabresi's insights in many ways, and his insights about insurance
have been no exception. For example, in a 1985 article, Richard Ep-
stein argued that products liability was a flawed insurance system and
that many of the losses that products liability imposed on manufactur-
ers would be more effectively insured against by victims.168 Analyzing
the tort liability and insurance "crisis" of the mid-1980s, George Priest
contended that liability insurance premiums had skyrocketed (and in-
surance had become completely unavailable for some enterprises) be-
cause modern tort liability made it impossible for liability insurance
accurately to differentiate the premiums charged different in-
sureds.169 In a series of articles, Steven Shavell analyzed the condi-
tions under which liability insurance and the deterrence of accidents
165. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987).
166. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 163.
167. SeeJeffrey O'Connell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health Insurance: A Neces-
sary Mix, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1306-07 (1994).
168. Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 645
(1985).
169. See Priest, supra note 165.
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will be consistent. 17' And I offered my own contribution by extending
Calabresi's insight that insurance categories do not always differenti-
ate among insureds in a way that is considered collectively desirable. I
showed how insurance categories are fashioned and how insurers' use
of these categories can be regulated to help achieve the degree and
kind of accident prevention and loss spreading that we collectively de-
sire, even when insurers have not done so themselves. 171 Moreover,
Calabresi's influence on more recent work in the area continues to be
felt. For example, in a number of articles, Jon Hanson has argued the
case for enterprise liability on the ground that liability insurance has
greater potential to create accident prevention incentives than first-
party insurance.172
CONCLUSION
We have come a long way since the first forms of liability insur-
ance were introduced in this country over a century ago. The early
ideas about the relation between liability insurance and accident pre-
vention contained the kernels of modern thought about this relation,
but they reflected older views regarding the purpose of liability insur-
ance mainly as a method of ensuring the capacity of tort defendants to
compensate victims. During the first half of the twentieth century the
focus on whether and to what extent tort law and its reform should be
employed to contribute to broad policies of social welfare resulted in
increasing emphasis being placed on the loss-spreading effects of lia-
bility insurance. As different sorts of tort reform were proposed and
debated, however, the relation between liability insurance and acci-
dent prevention was given noticeably little attention. It was not until
Guido Calabresi began to write that a full-blown framework for analyz-
ing this relationship emerged. That framework has influenced the
courts and legal scholars for over three decades now, and it continues
to organize and affect the way we think about the issue.
170. See Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELLJ. OF ECON. 120 (2001); Steven
Shavell, On the Social Function and Regulation of Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND
INS. 166, 168 (2000).
171. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 64-100 (1986).
172. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
EconomicJustication for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990); see also Steven P.
Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91
MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993).
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